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SEARCHING FOR REORGANIZATION
REALITIES
ELIZABETH WARREN
JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK*
I. INTRODUCTION
One measure of the success of a symposium is the sheer number of ideas
that get tossed around during the course of the proceedings. We find
ourselves speculating how different this toss-fest (the Washington
University Interdisciplinary Conference on Bankruptcy and Insolvency
Theory) might have been if all the participants had access to more
information about the business bankruptcy system. Would some ideas have
evaporated-shown to be silly excursions of limited interest? Would others
have been expanded and enriched with insights prompted by curious and
unanticipated twists in the actual functioning of the bankruptcy system?
Would issues have been framed differently, and would proposed solutions
find new forms? Or would the debates have continued as before, with
unexpected factual insights admitted only through the trade entrance and
kept below stairs?
We do not know the answer to these questions, but we speculate that
whenever information about the operation of a system is introduced into
debates about that system, something will change-even if it is only that
the debaters will have to ignore the data more aggressively than they did
when the data were not available. The nature of the change depends, at
* Elizabeth Warren is the William A. Schnader Professor of Commercial Law at the University
of Pennsylvania. Jay Lawrence Westbrook holds the Benno C. Schmidt Chair of Business Law at the
University of Texas School of Law. The authors are listed in alphabetical order to indicate equal
contribution to the work. This paper is the first to be published from the Business Bankruptcy Project,
in which our co-principal investigator is Dr. Teresa Sullivan, Vice-Provost, Associate Dean of Graduate
Studies and Professor of Sociology at The University of Texas at Austin. The Project is funded by the
Education Endowment of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, with supplemental funding
from other sources. See infra note 25. The views expressed here are our own and not necessarily those
of any funding agency.
The work of the Project rests largely on the shoulders of its staff, led by Charles Trenckmann and
Maria Vinall and ably assisted by Patti Giuffre. For this article, we are especially grateful to Charles
Trenckmann and Jennifer Frasier for their research assistance, and to Kyle Fox for additional research
help.
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least in part, on the nature of the information that is introduced.
We are developing a study that will introduce more data into the policy
debates about the business bankruptcy system. At the inception of this
study, we must decide what data to develop. In effect, we must decide on
a view of reality that we want to describe. The study, which is described
in more detail below, is a projected five-year longitudinal analysis of
business bankruptcy cases filed in twenty-three federal districts during
calendar year 1994. Because the information presently available from
systematic empirical studies on business bankruptcy is so limited,' our
study necessarily must be devoted in large part to establishing baseline data
about this sort of legal proceeding. But we have room within this
framework to explore other visions of what data are important.
This paper provides an opportunity to do two things simultaneously. It
continues a discussion we joined a decade ago about the role of empirical
work in policy debates.2 It also permits us to discuss specific issues that
we confront in designing our new study, and to explore how various sorts
of law-related realities might be defined and why one definition might be
preferred over another. As to the first point, we argue that a debate
without data is a useless excursion, a trip from nowhere to nowhere. As
to the second, more specific endeavor, we are conscious that empiricists
risk becoming captured by a view of reality that they can measure (looking
for the nickel under the lamppost), and thereby lose track of alternative
1. The leading contemporary study is the description of public companies in bankruptcy done by
LoPucki and Whitford. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125 (1990)
[hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining]; Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate
Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
669, 722 n.184 (1993) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Governance]; Lynn M. LoPucki & William
C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 597 (1993); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum
Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 11
(1991). The only other comprehensive study was done thirty years ago by the Brookings Institute.
DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM (1971). There
have been several smaller studies done in recent years, some of which are very helpful. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Herbert & Domenic E. Pacitti, Down and Out in Richmond, Virginia: The Distribution of
Assets in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Proceedings Closed During 1984-1987, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 303
(1988); Richard F. Fullenbaum & Marianna A. McNeil, The Function of Failure (March 1994)
(unpublished study, on file with the Small Business Administration, contract # SBA-664-OA-91); Lisa
Hill Fenning & Brian Tucker, Profile of Single Asset Real Estate Cases, L.A. COUNTY BAR ASS'N,
COM. L. & BANKR. SEC. NEWSL., Summer, 1994, at 4.
2. Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay L. Westbrook, The Use of Empirical Research
in Formulating Bankruptcy Policy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 195 [hereinafter Use].
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views that might also describe reality. With the presentation of this paper,
we seek ideas from colleagues in our field to help us focus our empirical
efforts in the most interesting and useful way. At the same time, we invite
those colleagues who do not labor in the field of fact to examine their
thinking and to consider how their thoughts might be different if they were
framed with more reference to hard data.
We begin by briefly surveying current academic and policy discussions
as to form and approach, offering a summary empiricist critique. We then
outline the study that we have undertaken with our co-principal investiga-
tor, Dr. Teresa Sullivan, giving a brief description of the central, compre-
hensive sample that this study will yield.3 We follow that section with an
acknowledgment of the limitations of the comprehensive sample and initiate
an exploration of the additional realities we might try to study, soliciting
the insights of our colleagues at this Symposium and elsewhere.
II. ACADEMIC SPECULATION
Financial speculation and bankruptcy have long gone together, at least
sequentially. Recently, the bankruptcy field has been deluged with
speculation of the academic sort. The latest round began with Lucian
Bebchuk's 1988 article in the Harvard Law Review which proposed
changing the Chapter II system by incorporating a semi-automatic
mechanism for dealing with financially distressed companies.' Among the
article's most notable features was a lack of reference to any constraints
imposed by reality. It had few citations to published cases. It had neither
data nor anecdotal references relating to the financial and legal realities of
business bankruptcy or of the capital markets for financially distressed
firms. This absence of factual basis made the piece somewhat difficult to
evaluate as a serious recommendation for statutory change. As pure theory,
the article was also problematic because it was premised on numerous
unarticulated assumptions about the world for which it suggested reform.'
3. A more complete and technically detailed discussion is found in Teresa A. Sullivan,
Methodological Realities: Social Science Methods and Business Reorganizations, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
1291 (1994) [hereinafter Methodological Realities].
4. Lucian A. Bebehuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775
(1988). For a succinct and excellent critique of the Bebchuk approach, see Lynn M. LoPucki,
Comment: Stakeholder Interests and Bankruptcy, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 711, 712-13 (1993) [hereinafter
Stakeholder].
5. For example, the author apparently assumed that all creditors would have equal access to
important information about the debtor company or that any differences in the availability of
information among creditors were not important as a matter of efficiency or fairness.
19941 1259
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Because those assumptions were neither acknowledged nor systematized,
it was impossible to determine whether the starting points for the logical
leaps made sense.
So far as we know, the semi-automatic market solution has had no
presence or even close analogy in the financial world. Yet the article has
been a terrific success in the academic world. The piece has spawned a
generation of speculative articles proposing various formulaic solutions to
the bankruptcy problems of unspecified worlds.6  And its form of
speculation without reference to reality-which had many precedents-has
since been widely imitated.7
Lest we seem unduly harsh in our critique, we should note that Professor
Bebchuk is a very smart law professor who has taught corporate law,
corporate finance, and law and economics for nearly a decade. Yet, he has
never practiced or taught in the bankruptcy field, and this article was his
first foray into the subject. The point for emphasis here is that a commen-
tator with little experience in the field wrote one of the most imitated
articles about business bankruptcies in recent years.
In the debates that followed Bebchuk's article, there was no absence of
those who strongly disagreed with Bebchuk's approach-often on terms as
abstract as those employed by Bebchuk himself. One of the difficulties
with articles of this genre, however, is that their lack of grounding in
empirical reality makes evaluation of any of the arguments nearly
impossible. For example, is an author proposing a solution for all
companies, or only for large companies, or for public companies, or for
6. See, e.g., Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101
YALE L.J. 1043, 1045 (1992) (claiming to begin with Bebchuk's analysis and to take it to its logical
conclusion).
7. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories ofAmerican Corporate Bankruptcy,
45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 323-33 (1993) (proposing "chameleon equity" to solve bankruptcy problems
through market sale of differently structured rights); Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of
Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 523 (1992) (auctioning bankrupt company will
perfectly yield value of company without transaction costs) [hereinafter Aghion ct al., Economics];
Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law, 46
J. FIN. 1189, 1192-99 (1991) (suggesting a "simple model of workouts and investment" laden with huge
assumptions, including that "bank negotiation is assumed to be costless'); Michael C. Jensen, Corporate
Control and the Politics of Finance, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 1991, at 13, 31 (arguing that
bankruptcy courts should auction offthe business by selling "riskless securities"); Robert K. Rasmussen,
Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51 (1992) (proposing that
companies and their voluntary creditors be given a menu of debtor-creditor laws from which to choose);
Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN.
ECON. 285, 300 (1990) (delivering the company into the hands of its creditors as a means to avoid
collection costs).
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some other subgroup? Or is the author simply indifferent to relevant
distinctions that might exist among companies?' If so, can the proposed
solution be seriously considered as part of a policy debate, as opposed to
an academic one?
Two of the latest examples of the abstract approach-and some of the
bizarre implications that would necessarily accompany any serious attempt
at actual implementation-have been presented in this Symposium.
Professor Adler argued again for "chameleon equity" based on the Bebchuk
model9 and Professor Rasmussen argued again for his "menu-based"
approach to bankruptcy-alternatives-by-contract.' 0 The symposium format,
however, revealed previously unknown aspects of these policy recommen-
dations. When confronted with questions about the distributive impact of
their proposals, for example, both authors conceded that a necessary first
step to the adoption of their proposals was a major reform of tort law, of
the law governing obligations owed to government entities, and of laws
governing other obligations to involuntary creditors."' Under these
8. For example, Bebchuk asserted the superiority of his proposal over all others, because it did
not require a market in the debtor company's securities to insure fairness, and therefore, it would apply
to all kinds of companies. See Bebchuk, supra note 4, at 790. But he was only referring to the fact
that the holders of various positions in the debtor company would have a choice as to buying or selling,
so that each of them would "have no basis for complaining." Id. In other words, the holder who could
not refer to a market for prices and might lack crucial information about the company had no basis for
complaint simply because the holder could "choose" to invest blindly or not. Professor Bebchuk either
was unaware of likely differences in information and information costs among holders, or he did not
consider them relevant to fairness. He also did not discuss or acknowledge any relevant differences
between the very small companies that populate the bankruptcy courts and the large, publicly traded
companies that populate the front page of the Wall Street Journal
9. Barry E. Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 811 (1994); see also Adler, supra
note 7. Adler's theory is that each level of claimant, starting at the bottom with equity, is forced to
choose between buying out those above the claimant in priority or forfeiting any claim in the troubled
company.
10. Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment Incentives,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159 (1994). Professor Rasmussen proposes that companies and their voluntary
creditors be able to choose from a menu of debtor-creditor laws, including some that would waive
bankruptcy protection for the company.
11. The discussion began with questions about what would happen to tort creditors under the Adler
and Rasmussen proposals. Both systems permit debtors to favor contract-based creditors, leaving
nothing for tort claimants or giving them the illusory option of assembling enough capital among
themselves to buy out the contract creditors. Professors Adler and Rasmussen insisted they never
intended such results and seemed to propose radical changes to tort law and the law of secured credit
that would give tort claimants priority under nonbankruptcy as well as bankruptcy law. The vast extent
of the needed reform was made clearer when the discussion moved to other claimants without contract-
based rights, such as government claims for environmental cleanup or injured competitors' claims under
the antitrust laws.
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schemes, nonbankruptcy law would need to be adjusted to provide priority
for involuntary creditors-or at least parity with contract-based creditors,
including Article 9 secured parties. Both authors evidently dismissed such
details as the trivial minutiae of implementation and regarded them as
insufficiently important to require even a passing mention in their articles
proposing reform. But for those seriously interested in legal reform,
evaluation of the chameleon-equity or menu-based approaches to bankrupt-
cy law might be very different if it were clear that such proposals were
based on a significantly modified nonbankruptcy system, especially one that
might sharply reduce the reliability of contract-based priorities.
Other proposals require leaps of intuition about the behavior of the
parties involved in a failing company and the events with which they must
cope. Professor Hart proposes a world in which bankruptcy could function
much more efficiently using his market-based substitution for valuation
efforts, 2 evidently assuming that valuation is the principal difficulty
causing delays and expense in current bankruptcies. In discussion,
however, he concedes that he does not know whether valuation is the
principal difficulty in most business bankruptcies or whether other practical
problems, such as distributional uncertainties or thin markets for failing
companies, may confound his substitute valuation approach. The empirical
evidence from Professors LoPucki and Whitford indicates that Professor
Hart's empirical premise may be wrong. Their data suggests that market
valuation may already be in use where it is useful to employ it and that
significant savings are accomplished by not forcing it on parties where
markets are inadequate to produce full value bids.13
It is unrealistic to demand that the proponent of every new idea become
an empiricist. At a minimum, however, it does not seem too onerous to
expect that authors who are not themselves empiricists should at least take
account of the empirical work that has been done. We might also
reasonably ask that they propose empirical research to test the robustness
of their theories, even if they have no intention of looking for the
underlying facts themselves.' 4
We will readily concede that our own commitment to empirical research
is more than simply a matter of principle. We enjoy thinking about reality.
12. Philippe Aghion et al., Improving Bankruptcy Procedure, 72 WAsH. U. L.Q. 849 (1994); see
also Aghion et al., Economics, supra note 7.
13. William C. Whitford, What's Right About Chapter 11, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1379, 1392-93
(1994).
14. See Use, supra note 2, at 226-31.
[VOL. 72:1257
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We find great satisfaction in struggling to impose some coherence upon its
unruly facts. We relish being utterly surprised, even flummoxed for a
while, by some unexpected fact."S We find it exhilarating to bring fact
and theory together to speculate about the power of law to affect the world
we observe. By contrast, we find reading purely theoretical articles rather
like playing anagrams. They are fun, but not filling.
This enthusiasm for analyzing collected data does not extend to the
actual gathering of data. We prefer air conditioning as much as our more
speculative colleagues do, and document collection often involves hot,
musty archives. We also dislike sitting in airports at 2 a.m., laden with
portable copiers and boxes of papers while we await a delayed plane home
from a distant courthouse. We feel sick over data dumps and frustrated by
the technical details of gathering forms from places where they are
supposed to be, but are not. We long for the day that the government will
gather the necessary data routinely and we can call them up by modem.
16
Until that noble time, however, we must gather our own fragments of
reality if we want to partake of the pleasure of assembling them. 7
III. POLICY SPECULATION
The dominance of speculation over systematic empirical inquiry has not
been limited to academe. Congress, too, has embraced theories unburdened
by fact. Proposed congressional legislation seems to rest in too many
respects on anecdote and speculation. A good example of the legislative
result of speculation is the proposed Chapter 10. A new "small business
chapter" may be a good idea, but it hangs in the air with no empirical
foundation. To support the new chapter, proponents most often cite the
15. In the consumer study, for example, when we found out that most of the Chapter 7 debtors
were homeowners, we were incredulous, then puzzled, and then fascinated. TERESA A. SULLIVAN,
ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND
CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 129 (1989) [hereinafter As WE FORGIVE].
16. See Use, supra note 2, at 226-31.
17. Of course, data gathering has its finer moments. Sometimes, a seemingly routine interview
with a judge or the casual comment of a trustee will suggest the importance of a variable that no one
had given any thought. Those moments help keep us going.
18. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, OMNIBUS BANKRUPTCY REFORM LEGISLATION, S.
REP. No. 168, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 4. Since the Conference, Congress has passed legislation
amending the Code without the proposed Chapter 10, which was deleted on the Senate floor by the
bill's principal sponsor, Senator Heflin. 140 CONG. REC. S4539-01, S4541 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994).
The new legislation creates a Commission to propose more extensive reforms, and it seems certain the
proposed Chapter 10 will be one of the ideas it will be asked to consider. Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106, § 601 (1994).
1994] 1263
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"fast track" procedure employed by the Honorable A. Thomas Small in the
Eastern District of North Carolina. 9 The implication that the new
Chapter 10 has somehow been tested is illusory. Judge Small's procedure
is a streamlined Chapter 11 approach. The proposed Chapter 10, by
contrast, would be a "Super" Chapter 13, a very different proposition both
in concept and practice. Few commentators seem to notice this difference
either in supporting or attacking the proposal.
The resulting debate is made even more amazing by the potential
availability of data that might give important insights about a Super
Chapter 13. In some parts of the country a "business Chapter 13"
(Business 13) is a fairly common occurrence, although it remains virtually
unknown in other places. According to data from the Administrative Office
of the Courts, nearly thirty-nine percent of the nonliquidation business
bankruptcies in the United States in 1993 were these Business 13s.2"
These cases presumably exemplify what we should expect in the proposed
Chapter 10, but this empirical connection seems to be a secret. Business
13s are virtually unmentioned in the bankruptcy literature 2"-at least at the
law review level-and they have not been a significant part of the limited
congressional debate that has occurred thus far.22 Are these Business 13
cases successful by some criteria of success? Is Chapter 13 fair in practice
to business creditors who do not get to vote? Is the Chapter 13 trustee
sufficiently equipped and properly compensated to supervise more business
cases? What does disposable income mean in the context of a small, solely
owned business? We have come close to enacting a near variation of
Business 13s without having a clue about how the current Business 13s
operate.
When it was first suggested that we propose a large empirical study of
business bankruptcy, everyone assumed that we would look at a lot of
Chapter 11 cases. Indeed, in its early phases, the study was simply referred
to as the "Chapter 11 Study." Once we started thinking about the problem
and, more importantly, started looking at the data available, we observed
that Business 13s, at least by number, seemed to be a substantial part of the
19. For a description of this procedure, see Hon. A. Thomas Small, Small Business Bankruptcy
Cases, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 305 (1993).
20. THE BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK AND ALMANAC 8 (Christopher M. McHugh ed., 4th ed. 1994)
[hereinafter YEARBOOK].
21. But see As WE FORGIVE, supra note 15, at 120-21, 123 n.7, 258 tbl. 13.6 (discussing the effect
of self-employment on chapter choice).
22. See The Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1993: Hearings on S. 540 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., I st Sess. (1993).
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business bankruptcy story. We decided to devote significant resources to
learning something about those cases as well. That decision was reinforced
by pending proposals for Chapter 10. We also came to realize that we
would have to study Chapter 7 business cases, because liquidation
establishes the bankruptcy baseline, both in theory and in practice, and no
one had taken much of a look at business liquidation since the Brookings
Study in the 1960s23 and a small, but excellent study by Herbert and
Pacitti in 1987.24 Thus, our sample is now divided into thirds, business
filings in Chapter 7, in Chapter 13, and in Chapter 11. We have defined
the reality of business bankruptcy informed by some available data, some
theoretical insights, and some intuitions about what constitutes the business
system.
To a large extent, speculative academic articles assume, usually
implicitly, that there is only one type of business bankruptcy case: the
large, usually public company. Pending legislation, on the other hand,
assumes that there are serious problems in a very different sort of case-the
small business proceeding. Even taken together, the debates seem to posit
that all business Chapter 11 cases are exemplified either by Eastern Air
Lines or Joe's Welding. This stereotyping has occurred even though the
few data we have suggest a continuum of proceedings, including many
cases lying between Joe's and Eastern.
This paper is about our search for the reality of business bankrupt-
cy-from the perspective of people lucky enough to have been given
substantial resources for empirical research. Even generous resources are
spartan compared with the range of all possible research, however, so we
must make the very best decisions we can about what to study and how to
study it. We have made some decisions, but we still have some important
decisions to make. We wrote this paper to stimulate discussion about how
one makes those decisions and to explore how empirical research fits into
the academic and policy debates in our field.
IV. THE STUDY: A CROSS-SECTION OF REALITY AS A WHOLE
We have the good fortune, and the daunting responsibility, of being the
recipients of a substantial grant from the Educational Endowment of the
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges to conduct an empirical study
23. STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 1, at 107-46.
24. Herbert & Pacitti, supra note 1.
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of business bankruptcy.' The general goals of the study include the
following:
1) To identify the characteristics of the businesses and individuals that
use bankruptcy, including a financial profile of the business, the
business' operating status at the time of filing, the sizes and types of
businesses, the events businesses report as triggering their bankruptcy
filings, and the businesses' description of what they hope to accomplish
in the bankruptcy proceeding. Because the study will include data from
business debtors filing in Chapter 11, Chapter 7, and Chapter 13, we
hope to create a spectrum that accurately describes the range of debtors
in the bankruptcy system.
2) To explore the disposition of business cases with a particular focus on
Chapter 11 cases, including the proportion of dismissals, conversions,
and confirmations, the time involved in dispositions, the fees awarded
during the bankruptcy process, the amount and kind of debt repaid or
promised to be repaid, the number of employees retained while the
business remains operational, and the court management procedures
employed in the cases.
3) To examine associations among the factors identified: for example,
whether certain fast-track or other case management procedures identify
unsuccessful cases and eliminate them from the system earlier; whether
size or type of business, or status as owner-managed, correlates with
confirmation rates or other indicia of success; whether the existence and
extent of security correlates with confirmation or other indicia of success;
whether cases that are dismissed usually result in termination of
operations or liquidation of the business within a short time; whether
creditors are paid or promised more in cases that are converted,
dismissed, or confirmed; and whether fees awarded bear any relationship
to outcomes.
4) To gather data on Chapter 7 business bankruptcies in order to
establish a baseline of debtor characteristics and typical results in such
cases, with an emphasis on amounts distributed for administration costs
and to creditors of various classes, and with some attempt to identify
sales of businesses as going concerns.
25. We have also received supplementary grants from the Arthur Moiler Chair in Bankruptcy Law
and Practice at the University of Texas at Austin and from the National Bankruptcy Conference. In
addition, we continue to apply for other research funds to complete other parts of the data gathering.
[VOL. 72:1257
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss3/31
SEARCHING FOR REORGANIZATION REALITIES
5) To explore Chapter 11 as a liquidation mechanism, identifying the
cases in which Chapter 11 is being used, explicitly or implicitly, as a
method of liquidation rather than as a reorganization effort; to attempt
to identify criteria that are characteristic of such cases; and to compare
results in Chapter 11 liquidation cases to those in Chapter 7 cases.
6) To examine the use of Chapter 13 for the resolution of problems for
small businesses by gathering data on plans, payouts, and outcomes in
those cases and comparing those data with the data gathered about small
businesses in Chapter 11 and Chapter 7.
The origin of the goals of this study is something of an odyssey in itself.
In part, the goals simply derive from our own experiences through years of
studying (and, for one of us, practicing in) the bankruptcy system. We
produced questions in two categories. The first category was information
that is fundamental to all questions about business bankruptcy. We tried
to determine what kind of information would be relevant to almost any
conceivable question about the bankruptcy system or to any hypothesis
about how it operates. The central example is the financial information
filed with the petition. It is hard to think of any sensible question or theory
about bankruptcy that would not be informed by knowing something about
the financial circumstances of business debtors at the time of filing. The
same is true about the ownership and management structure of the business
and other similar data.
The second sort of question we asked of ourselves arose from our own
questions about the system. Is it possible that companies from certain
industries are consistently more successful at reorganizing in Chapter 11,
whereas companies from other industries use Chapter 11 only as a delaying
tactic on the way to liquidation? Are single asset real estate cases a
substantial fraction of Chapter 11 cases or just a prominent one? How
much do unsecured creditors receive on average in confirmed Chapter 11
cases? The list of potential inquiries goes on and on.
Our questions blended imperceptibly into the third category--questions
that have arisen in the great policy debates about business bankruptcy over
the last decade. Over and over, the disputants have asserted this and that
about the system, with no idea whether the assertions were true, but with
much riding on their truth or falsity. Is there really great delay and cost in
Chapter 11 cases? Of course, that question is meaningless in the usual
form in which it is asked, because it is not compared with some standard
(for example, delay and cost in civil litigation generally, or delay and cost
19941 1267
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in initial public offerings 26). Notwithstanding that problem, however, we
speculate that the policy debates would acquire some substance if we knew
how long Chapter 11 cases take (that is, the ones that get to confirmation)
and how much they cost. It would be better still if we knew cost-and-delay
information for various sizes and types of Chapter 11 cases.
These questions and others from the public debates have furnished us
with questions and goals for the study. Note that many of our questions
share with the public-debate questions the characteristic that they are
oriented to law reform and to improving the system. That similarity is
worth noting because it is generally unfashionable for law professors to
worry too much about real reform, perhaps because such an approach is
frequently antithetical to the more sweeping questions thought to be
appropriate to the academy.
The third source of questions has been judges, lawyers, trustees, and
others active within the system. The judges have been a particularly
valuable resource, although we want to emphasize that no judge has ever
sought, expressly or impliedly, to determine or limit what we ask in this
study or to require the inclusion of any question or research goal. We have
asked judges about their views of the system because we believe their
perspective gives them unique insights about the system. They have
supplied us with long lists of questions about how bankruptcy operates.
Not surprisingly, this source too has a law-reform orientation. Overall, our
questions and goals are a curious blend of a childish eagerness to learn for
the sake of learning-to "know how it works"--combined with an old-
fashioned determination to gain the knowledge required to improve the
bankruptcy system.
In an academic setting such as this Conference, the obvious question is:
Why have we not stated a series of hypotheses based on some theory which
we will test empirically? The question quickly leads to issues far beyond
the scope of this paper, but it is appropriate that we should address it
briefly, saving a full analysis for another occasion.
The first response must be to note that all of our "goals" and questions
can be restated as formal hypotheses. For example:
There is a positive relationship between financial condition (balance sheet,
cash flow, and so on) and success in confirming a Chapter 11 plan. A
similar relationship exists between financial condition and the total amount
paid to unsecured creditors under such plans.
26. There could also be a comparison with nonbankruptcy workouts, but that raises its own
problems. See infra note 61.
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" Administrative costs bear a positive relationship to time spent in bankrupt-
cy.
" Creditors' committee activity is positively correlated with overall costs, but
not with improved creditor payout.
" Active managerial judging will have a positive effect on the cost and the
success of reorganization cases.
The study does not lack for hypotheses. As this list suggests, we could
articulate dozens of hypotheses that we will test in the course of our data
analyses. What the study does lack, however, is a single overarching
theory or a single hypotheses to be tested. Each hypothesis we review
represents a theory about the world, but no one theory generates all of the
hypotheses. We understand much of the critique of our approach at the
Conference to be reducible to a complaint that we go forth to find facts
without some large theory that generates all the hypotheses we will test.
For that reason, it is important to acknowledge clearly that we are doing
just that and that we make no apologies.
We stick to our refusal to embrace an overarching theory for two
reasons. The first is that the study of law as a social phenomenon, and as
a functioning set of institutions in a complex society, is in its infancy. Law
as a set of doctrines or as moral and political philosophy has long been the
subject of great minds, but law as a functioning social artifact is a much
newer subject of study. To the extent that science is our guide, the proper
model is physics in the seventeenth century, not the twentieth. Today's
legal empiricists are closer to Galileo than to Fermi. Our science is at the
early stage of observation, description, and classification-not at the later
stage of refined experiments testing ever narrower hypotheses that bring
reality into tighter focus. Perhaps our work is closer to the kind that
Clifford Geertz calls "thick description. 27 By any measure, however, we
are not on the verge of a unified field theory.
Thus, it is entirely appropriate that we approach our modest undertaking
in the spirit of Lewis and Clark setting out into the wilderness. Like Lewis
and Clark, we set out knowing the Pacific is over in that direction. But it
would be folly to pretend we have some grand theory that covers the entire
spectrum.
We believe that to indulge in the hubris of a grand theory would actually
prejudice our efforts. We do not wish to be prisoners of our articulated
27. See generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973); CLIFFORD
GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRErIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1983).
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hypotheses. We deliberately overcollect data, unsure at this stage when we
might record data that fit no established hypotheses but that, in the
serendipity of exploration, might give us some critical insights into the
bankruptcy system.28 The process is expensive and consumes more time
and energy than would a more highly focused rifle-shot study that explores
a handful of discrete operational hypotheses. At some point, those rifle-
shots will be the appropriate vehicles to move along policy debates about
the bankruptcy system. But because so little has been systematically
recorded about the operation of the system, we feel bound to do a more
open-ended, dense collection of data. Thus, we can open our data to use
by other scholars and provide, we hope, a background against which other
studies might later unfold.
The second reason we have not designed the study around formal
hypotheses linked to a single theory is that those who aspire to be theorists
in our field do not generate testable hypotheses. This point is developed
below.
29
These goals we have mapped out are as ambitious as they are general.
We have already constructed the central, comprehensive sample that will
be the centerpiece of our study, which we expose in summary form below
for critique and comments and which is developed in finer detail by our co-
investigator, Dr. Teresa Sullivan, in the following paper, Methodological
Realities: Social Science Methods and Business Reorganizations. In our
paper, we put forward a request for help in defining additional realities
beyond this comprehensive sample. In the section following the discussion
of the comprehensive sample, we offer some ideas about alternative
samples we might explore, which we hope will stimulate a discussion of
the most important realities of the bankruptcy system.
28. Our consumer study provides many examples. We recorded information about lawsuits mainly
because it was there, but it turned out, to our surprise, that there were very few lawsuits given the fact
that these debtors were in default on most, if not all, of their obligations. See As WE FORGIVE, supra
note 15, at 305; Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, The Persistence of Local
Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PuB.
POL. 801, 851 n.144 (1994) [hereinafter Local Legal Culture]. Then again, we had no particular
hypothesis about the role of homeownership in consumer bankruptcy, and the literature revealed very
little, but we recorded it and it turned out to be important in a host of different ways. See As WE
FORGIVE, supra note 15, at 128-46. For the most part, the few ideas the literature had proposed about
the relationship of homeownership to bankruptcy turned out to be wrong. These data revealed important
social functions of consumer bankruptcy which a hypothesis-constrained study would have been very
unlikely to reveal. Id. at 84-85, 104 n.3.
29. See discussion infra Part VII.
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V. THE COMPREHENSIVE SAMPLE30
Our principal data collection efforts will be directed toward gathering a
comprehensive sample of bankruptcy cases. For this sample, we are
looking both for typical bankruptcy cases and for the range of variation that
occurs within the system.
For the comprehensive sample, we have tried to retain the advantages of
sampling, while limiting the locations at which we will collect data to a
manageable number of sites. Our sample is taken from twenty-three
districts that will be the sites for our study; in each site we will sample
cases wherever they are kept.3 We sample all the sites within a district
in order to capture the full range of variation in cases within the district.
32
The two most important methodological decisions we have had to make
are: (1) how to select the districts, and (2) how to select the cases within
each district.
A. Selection of Districts
The districts we sample take account of some of the major sources of
heterogeneity that can be foreseen at the beginning of the study. Our strata
include the following: judicial circuit; the relative number of filings within
the district (high-filing versus low-filing); the distribution of filings among
the different kinds of business bankruptcies (Chapter 7, Chapter 11, Chapter
13), and case management practices. Within each judicial circuit, we have
established as our initial criterion the selection of two districts: the district
with the highest number of business filings, and the district with the lowest
number of business filings. Circuit-level rulings are a conceivable
influence on the operation of the courts. Moreover, this criterion gives us
a suitable geographic distribution of districts and also tends to represent
equally the parts of the country that are experiencing good economic times
and those that are in regional recessions.
30. For a more detailed discussion of the sample, see Methodological Realities, supra note 3, at
1297-1302.
31. In some districts, cases are filed and stored in only one city, while in others, they are filed and
stored in several cities. In New Jersey, for example, cases are filed and kept in Camden, Trenton, and
Newark, while in Delaware, cases are filed and stored only in Wilmington. Because some districts use
multiple-city filing, the number of cities from which we must collect data for the twenty-three districts
is forty-three.
32. In some districts, we may need to make special arrangements to draw cases from divisions in
proportion to the total number of cases filed in the division during the preceding year, lest we
underrepresent cases from some divisions.
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It was also necessary, however, that we have sufficient cases to conduct
our analysis, so we set ancillary criteria: at least fifty Chapter 11 cases had
to have been filed during the twelve months ending in June 1993 (the most
recent time period for which we had data). In order to select a district with
a fast-track case management system, we selected the Eastern District of
North Carolina for our study, even though it would have ranked only third
within the Fourth Circuit as the low-filing district best fitting all of our
criteria.33 Because we emphasized Chapter 11 in our selection criteria, we
ended up with some districts that may yield fewer than fifty business
Chapter 13 cases. All the districts chosen should have more than fifty
business Chapter 7 filings.
The districts chosen because they had the highest number of business
filings in their circuit were: District of Massachusetts, Southern District of
New York, District of New Jersey, District of Maryland, Northern District
of Texas, Eastern District of Michigan, Northern District of Illinois, District
of Minnesota, Central District of California, District of Colorado, and
Middle District of Florida. In this group, the Southern District of New
York recorded only six Business 13s, which means that its case base for
that chapter is likely to be deficient.
The districts chosen because they had the lowest number of business
filings in 1992 in their circuit, but had at least fifty Chapter 1 Is, were:
District of New Hampshire (one Business 13), District of Connecticut,
District of Delaware (seventeen Business 13s), Eastern District of North
Carolina, Eastern District of Louisiana (no Business 13s), Western District
of Tennessee, Eastern District of Wisconsin (forty-one Business 13s),
District of Nebraska (forty-one Business 13s), Western District of
Oklahoma (thirty-eight Business 13s), District of Hawaii (six Business 13s),
and Middle District of Georgia (fourteen Business 13s). As the parentheti-
cal numbers indicate, only three of these districts (Connecticut, Eastern
North Carolina, and Western Tennessee) had as many as fifty Business 13s.
Connecticut was the second best choice in the Second Circuit, but it was
chosen because it had at least fifty Chapter 1 ls. The difficulty that should
become apparent is that low-volume Chapter 11 districts often tend to be
even lower-volume Business 13 districts. Insisting on a sufficient number
of Chapter 13 business filings as well would have eliminated many low-
volume districts entirely and generally skewed the sample toward high-
33. It would actually have been only fifth-best as a low-filing district, but two other low-filing
jurisdictions were independently disqualified because they did not have enough Chapter I I cases.
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volume districts.
At the suggestion of several of the bankruptcy judges with whom we
consulted, we added an additional district within the Ninth Circuit, the
Western District of Washington. The Ninth Circuit currently accounts for
about one-third of the bankruptcies in the country, which argues for its
greater inclusion in the district samples to better reflect the national filing
data. In addition, because a proposal to create a new Twelfth Circuit is
pending, we wanted to include at least one district that would become part
of this new circuit. Of the potential Twelfth Circuit districts, Western
Washington would be the "high-filing" district.
All together, our twenty-three districts represented about forty-two
percent of the business cases filed in the United States in 1993, according
to the data provided by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. 34
Professor LoPucki has challenged us by saying that we should have
focused on the districts with the most cases, so that our sample would
reflect the largest portion of U.S. bankruptcy filings. He argues that
because we cannot achieve a completely representative sample short of
sampling all districts, we would do better to draw a sample from the
districts with the maximum number of cases. The point is well worth
considering, but after consideration we disagree.
Such a sampling technique would not permit us to determine whether
business bankruptcies served a different function in low-filing districts than
in high-filing districts. It is possible, for example, that workouts occur
outside the formal system altogether in low-filing districts and that the
business bankruptcy system is used principally to say a blessing over
imminent liquidations. In high-filing districts, debtors might file bankrupt-
cy earlier in their times of trouble and make a more aggressive effort to
reorganize their businesses through the bankruptcy courts. We sacrifice
some improvement in the size of the sample from which we draw our cases
in order to pick up lower-volume districts that might represent important
variations. In balancing the competing considerations, we believe our
sample is of sufficient size to retain the advantages associated with drawing
cases from a large sample.
34. In 1993, there were 25,872 business cases filed in our twenty-three districts and 62,304
business cases filed nationwide. See YEARBOOK, supra note 20, at 17-20.
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B. Selection of Cases
In considering the selection of a representative sample of cases, we face
the unexpectedly thorny problem of defining a "business" bankruptcy for
the purposes of determining eligibility for our study. The Administrative
Office of the Courts defines business cases as those for which someone
(presumably, but not necessarily, the debtor's attorney) has checked the
"business" designation on the front sheet of the filing. We decided this
definition might be both overinclusive and underinclusive. We define a
case as a "business" bankruptcy if any of the following indicia are present:
1) the lawyer has checked "business" in the business-nonbusiness box on
the face sheet of the petition; 2) the petitioner has a business style (e.g.,
"Corp.," "Inc.," "Co."); 3) the petitioner has a designation of "doing
business as," of "formerly doing business as," or of "also known as" if the
second designation is a business. Our pretests indicate that the overlap
among these indicia varies substantially by district. In order to be as
inclusive as possible, we accept cases that meet any of the three criteria.
If, however, when we interview the debtor, the debtor denies that there is
a business bankruptcy, we administer an additional set of questions
designed to probe whether a failure of the debtor's business is involved in
the bankruptcy filing. This permits us to eliminate from our sample
obvious mistakes, such as the bankruptcy of a wage earner whose attorney
simply checked the wrong box.
Within each district, every business bankruptcy case should have an
equal chance of being selected in order to minimize the risk that the sample
would be unrepresentative. For the most part, we achieve that result by
drawing cases in the order in which they are filed, with random selection
for ties."5 The objective of these procedures is to minimize human
judgment that might introduce bias into the sample. By setting up these
procedures a priori, we increase the likelihood that the sample will be
representative. On the other hand, the odds are against any particular case,
even a case of stunning magnitude, falling into the sample.36
35. In some high-volume districts, for example, a single day's filings may exceed the number of
cases needed for the sample for the quarter. In order to minimize any bias in the selection of such
cases, we select the sample randomly from that day's filings.
36. Thus, we can already tell that we missed the Zsa Zsa Gabor and Lynn Redgrave filings, even
though we confess that we looked to see if they popped up in the sample.
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C. Expected Results
The following are some of the many categories of data that we expect
to obtain from the comprehensive sample:
From the files:
* Complete financial data
* Type and timing of events during bankruptcy (for example, lift stay
motions, cash collateral orders, and so forth)
* Distributions to creditors
* Professional fees
* Distribution and time of outcomes (for example, confirmation, dismissal,
or conversion)
From the debtors:
* Structure of debtor ownership (family, closely held, dispersed nonpublic,
public, etc.)
* Perceived causes of the business' difficulties
* Debtors' goals in filing
* Basis for choice of a bankruptcy remedy
* Number and type of employees affected
* Debtors' perceptions of the system
From other sources (as available):
* Classification of judge's managerial styles
* Brief history of each business
We hope to be able to use these data to develop a fairly comprehensive
baseline picture of business bankruptcy filings, including theorized
relationships. For example, we may be able to determine if success of a
case is significantly related to the size of the business, the structure of the
business, the case management techniques employed by various judges, the
attorney fee arrangements or size of fees, and so on. We may be able to
establish in liquidation cases, for example, whether tax debts seem to weigh
heavily toward the liquidation alternative, and whether ownership and
management structures seem to contribute to the likelihood of liquidation
rather than reorganization. We will be able to determine the amounts
distributed to creditors in various kinds of cases and to compare payouts
among Chapters 7, 11, and 13. We are continually amazed that we lack
information so basic about this system. The fact that we do underscores
the point that this type of study is still in its infancy and that baseline data
are the most indispensable product of a large, comprehensive study.
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VI. BUT Is IT REALITY?
The comprehensive sample will give us a good idea of the typical
businesses that use bankruptcy. It will provide a great deal of basic
information about how the system operates and the identity of the debtors
and creditors tangled within it. But is it reality?
In one sense, of course it is. It is the fundamental reality. The
comprehensive sample is a large, statistical cross-section of the businesses
that file for bankruptcy. It is not merely representative; it also provides the
essential baseline of business failures and the legal system's response to
those failures. Among other things, it is not possible to understand fully
how the system deals with one type of case without comparing and
contrasting the system's treatment of other types of cases. Given our
current ignorance, a large empirical project must start with such a
comparison.
But the comprehensive sample, by using each business that files as an
equally important unit of analysis, obscures other realities. We could
predict to have as few as four public company cases in our sample." The
odds against finding enough publicly traded cases to analyze statistically
within a sample are astronomical. But Macy's bankruptcy filing involves
more debt, more jobs, more real estate, more lawyers, more newspaper ink,
and more paper than the bankruptcy of Harrelson's Fixup of Bethany,
Oklahoma. 8 Harrelson's has already made it into the comprehensive
sample; the 1994 equivalent of Macy's may not. Although all of the cases
like Harrelson's Fixup together may be more important than Macy's, a
discussion of the business bankruptcy system without companies like
Macy's has a hole in it.
37. In 1993, only 86 public companies filed for bankruptcy out of 50,721 Chapter 7 and II
business filings. The percentage of public company filings was 0.16955%, or about 1.7 out of every
thousand cases. See YEARBOOK, supra note 20, at 37, 60. Our sample will consist of approximately
2,208 business cases in Chapters 7 and 1I. Assuming a random distribution of cases, multiplying
0.0016955 by 2,208 produces an approximate value of 3.7. Of course, there are other variables,
including the possibility that we will get more public cases because our districts include Delaware and
Southern New York.
38. The name has been changed to protect the insolvent. Although the bankruptcy files arc public
records, we are committed to keeping confidential the names of the small companies and individuals
we sample. See AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL ASS'N, CODE OF ETHICS IB(2), (10) (1989) (stating that
human subject anonymity should be protected regardless of funding source); Daniel B. Cornfield &
Teresa A. Sullivan, Fieldwork in the Oligopoly: Protecting the Corporate Subject, 42 HUM, OROANIZA-
TION 258 (1983) (discussing the need to conceal the identity of large, complex, profit-making
organizations in case studies to promote access to large corporations and to ease tension between
researchers and corporate managers).
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We recognize the intuition that somehow we need to know about the
1994 equivalent of Macy's as well as about Harrelson's in order to describe
the business bankruptcy system. But to assert that bankruptcies of large
companies are much more important than their proportion of the total
number of filings is to put forth another unspoken assertion: criteria other
than numerosity define "important" and thus construct another bankruptcy
reality. We wanted to explore those other realities in this Conference.
We describe below five competing slices of reality that we might try to
observe in an empirical study of business bankruptcy. We discuss the pros
and cons of each in the context of the policy debates and the existing
academic dialogue.
A. Economic Impact-Sample Dollars Instead of Cases
Policymakers are probably most interested in the businesses that have the
greatest economic impact. That part is easy. How to measure economic
impact is a little more treacherous.
Is the sorting device for economic importance the amount of debt listed
by the failing company? This criterion makes some sense. After all,
bankruptcy is about debtors and creditors, and debt is what brings them
together. So perhaps big debt is the appropriate measure of importance.
But what should the debt criterion encompass? Should we include all debt,
even if it is fully or mostly secured and therefore likely to be repaid in full,
in or out of bankruptcy? Such a test would eliminate cases with lower
debt, but this result may not be beneficial. The lower-debt cases may
include nearly all unsecured debt that is subject to discharge in a Chapter
11 reorganization and that may be held by the unsecured creditors who are
traditionally the targeted beneficiaries of the bankruptcy system. If sheer
size of debt were the sorting device, would we thereby disproportionately
include companies that borrowed to invest in other ventures, and have few
employees and no product or service of their own? If we ratchet up the
debt levels sufficiently, we might limit our sample to the carcasses left
from leveraged buyouts. These debt-laden companies surely have a story
to tell, but if the criterion is "economic importance," is this the most
important story about what is happening to faltering American companies?
If secured debt counts, would companies seeking to reorganize the debt that
permitted them to purchase real estate-hotels, office buildings, and
apartment complexes-dominate the sample, perhaps skewing it toward
limited partnerships organized in part to shelter income from taxes and in
part to pick up the spare cash of risk-loving dentists?
Perhaps in a search for economic importance we might shift to an
exploration of the effect of bankruptcy on jobs. Since presidential politics
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seem to turn on how many jobs one party or another can claim to have
created, perhaps bankruptcy's importance should be measured by the
number of jobs it purports to save. We could start by determining the
number of workers employed by each debtor. That would tell us how
many jobs are contingent on the success of this reorganization effort.
Of course, if jobs are the critical measure, then we should also consider
the multiplier effect-all of the people whose jobs depend indirectly on the
troubled business. Those of us old enough to remember when Chrysler was
in trouble in the late 1970s recall the news stories about the potential
impact of a shutdown on suppliers and small businesses throughout the
Midwest.39 Because each dependent business is small, they-and their
employees-would be hard to find in a sample drawn to screen for high-
employment businesses. A debtor's demise may affect thousands of other
jobs, and yet its own displaced employees might number only in the
handfuls.
It also is possible that a liquidation would not put anyone out of work.
Those who believe in perfect markets would simply hypothesize good jobs
for all those displaced, and in some cases they would be right. Perhaps the
business could be sold intact. Perhaps the employees have skills that are
valued elsewhere and they could make a smooth transition to other jobs.
Perhaps workers are largely fungible, and can be inserted anywhere in the
economy as needed-former parts welders from Ypsilanti can fill the
demand for waiters in Mexican restaurants in Santa Fe. Perhaps.
We could measure economic importance yet another way. We could
create a sample of publicly traded companies. These companies have
already proven their importance to the American economy in a significant
way: they made it through an initial public offering of their stock. Of
course, this sample would omit some very big companies that have been
taken private.4" Beyond the leveraged buyouts, such a move would
exclude a large number of multi-million dollar companies that employ tens
of thousands and borrow billions, but are held by families, trusts,
investment consortia, and other nonpublic holders.
More critically, the public-company criteria might prove too narrow in
another way. The public companies may be big and important, but they are
39. See generally MICHAEL MORnTZ & BARRETT SEAMAN, GOIo FOR BROKE: THE CHRYSLER
STORY (1981).
40. For example, TLC Beatrice is a huge conglomerate that would not qualify for a public-
company sample if it became financially troubled because it was taken private in 1986 and is no longer
publicly traded. See Bloomberg Business News, 46 Beatrice Holders Plan Sales of Shares, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 28, 1993, at C2, D2.
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only a tiny fraction of the debtor pool. Consequently, a tight focus on
them might tell a story that is not about the either the economic system or
the bankruptcy system so much as it is about aberrations such as takeovers
and debt releveraging that affect only a very specialized subset of American
industry. In the early 1990s, bankruptcy filings of publicly traded
companies shot up-far out of proportion to the rise in the same years in
all business filings.4 Some experts speculate that the sharp rise had to do
with the junk bond trend of the 1980s more than anything about the overall
economy or the bankruptcy system itself.42 This speculation may or may
not be true, but with a tiny case base, the possibility for wild distortions in
the reported data are exceedingly high. Five more cases filed in 1993, for
example, would have meant a six percent increase in total public-company
filings-and a proportionate shift in whatever data were collected from
these companies.
Perhaps the most compelling reason not to create a public-company
sample is a pragmatic one. LoPucki and Whifford have published an
excellent study.43 In a world of infinite resources, we would like to revisit
this sample, perhaps asking different questions this time about the progress
of the bankruptcy cases and looking for changes over time between the
companies filing in the early 1980s and those in the early 1990s. But
neither resources nor time are infinite. The LoPucki and Whitford study
was very resource-intensive. The researchers took several years to study
43 companies.' They interviewed 125 attorneys, managers, and other
people associated with the cases in their sample.4 ' And when they were
through, they lit a candle that shed some important light on the bankrupt-
cies of publicly traded companies. Until there are more candles to go
around, it seems a little wasteful to light another so nearby.
B. Public Attention
Economics are important, but they do not play an overwhelmingly
influential role in shaping policies and perceptions about the bankruptcy
system. We could study those cases that have an important impact on the
41. Alison Leigh Cowan, The Bankruptcy Business Hits Hard Times, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 13, 1994,
at Al [hereinafter Hard Times].
42. Id.
43. See LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining, supra note 1.
44. These were public companies with over $100 million in assets that filed from 1979 to early
1988. See LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining, supra note 1, at 134-35.
45. See LoPucki & Whitford, Governance, supra note 1, at 722 n.184.
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bankruptcy debates for reasons that are only incidentally related to their
economic importance.
We think of this sample as the bankruptcy equivalent of Lifestyles of the
Rich and Famous. A number of factors enhance voyeuristic attraction.
Business bankruptcy is frequently low on the salacious scale, but as a
subculture we have our own "rich and famous" that provide the fodder for
the cocktail party references necessary to show one's status as a player.
Moreover, we recognize that some cases generate lots of public interest-or
at least the interest of reporters, who, in turn, try to stir some public
interest. We could select a sample from these cases.
How would we pick a Public Impact sample? We could choose cases
discussed in the New York Times, whose reporters seem to spend an
extraordinary amount of time poring over lawyer time sheets and expense
accounts in big bankruptcy cases, describing the professionals as "vultures"
and the companies as "carrion."46 The unstated sorting device would be
importance to mid-town law firms. Or we could pick cases mentioned in
the Wall Street Journal. Either approach might give us a powerful East
Coast bias, but that would cut down on travel costs. We might expand the
sample to pick up bankruptcies mentioned in the key newspapers in a
dozen American cities, which would give us Kim Basinger and the
Baltimore Orioles, along with the bankruptcies of companies tied to local
notables. Perhaps we could even include the rural papers. We would
surely find out what inquiring minds want to know.
We make this suggestion only half tongue-in-cheek. We recognize the
power of the press to shape the perceptions of how the bankruptcy system
operates. And we are mindful that important legal policies may be shaped
by such perceptions. Following the Eastern Airlines filing, Congress held
quick public hearings to consider amending the laws regarding substantive
consolidation in bankruptcies in the airline industry as a possible counter-
move to Frank Lorenzo's unpopular public stunts. A single bad case-if
retold often enough and vividly enough-has the power to change a legal
system.
C. Social Impact
Some business bankruptcies create a public impact disproportionate to
their assets and liabilities because they profoundly affect other segments of
46. See, e.g., Hard Times, supra note 41, at C2, C12.
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American life.47  An airline bankruptcy is a good example, with the
infrastructure of the country's transportation system gravely threatened-or
not. As with jobs, one can debate the existence or extent of the effects, but
one cannot deny that some kinds of cases might plausibly have dispropor-
tionate effects on communities, or even the country as a whole. A similar
situation may arise in other transportation bankruptcies, such as bus lines
or trucking companies, or in the bankruptcies of other infrastructure
businesses, such as power companies and hospitals.
Some commentators have gone so far as to propose that certain cases
should receive separate statutory treatment. For example, some specialists
have suggested that asbestos cases should be treated under a separate
provision (a Chapter 14) added to the Bankruptcy Code.48 Still others see
a pressing need to rationalize the insolvency law of the insurance industry,
perhaps putting it under a new section of the Bankruptcy Code.49
The key point here is the presence of a magnified public interest, beyond
the immediate concerns of stockholders, creditors, and employees. It may
be that for some industries specialized treatment is appropriate to reflect the
unique interests of the community. A study might, for example, consider
the effects on communities of transportation bankruptcies that leave those
communities without adequate airline connections or truck deliveries.
Among other things, one could consider whether changes in the bankruptcy
laws would be an appropriate response or whether public subsidies are a
more sensible way to deal with these special problems.
The difficulties of undertaking such a study, however, are sizeable.
Without a detailed, comprehensive data base covering a number of
industries, it is almost impossible to analyze the data. Are the data the
product of differences in the industry, or are they widely replicated
elsewhere? Without a good baseline, it is almost impossible to develop a
meaningful study of a special subset. Moreover, the payoff from single-
47. See, e.g., RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD
BANKRUPTCY (1991) (discussing the A.H. Robins bankruptcy). See also KEVIN J. DELANEY, STRATEGIC
BANKRUPTCY: How CORPORATIONS USE CHAPTER 11 TO THEIR ADVANTAGE (1992).
48. David Johnston, Some Would Write Asbestos into Bankruptcy Law, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 6,
1993, at CI.
49. See, e.g., Stephen W. Schwab et al., Onset of an Offset Revolution: The Application ofSet-Offs
in Insurance Insolvencies, 95 DICK. L. REV. 449 (1991); ABA Business Law Section, Business
Bankruptcy Committee, Insurance Insolvency: A Proposed Federal Venue (1991); Close Watch on the
Insurance Industry, Part II-ndependent RegulatoryAgency Proposed, 21 BANKR. CT. DEC. 39-1 (Sept.
26, 1991).
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sector studies are necessarily also limited. By definition, generalization is
almost impossible, which makes it difficult to explain spending scarce
resources for forays in this direction. On the other hand, some might argue
that the presence of a great public interest in these sectors justifies such
priority treatment.
D. Hot Legal Disputes
Bankruptcy is a legal system, and like all legal systems, at any given
time there are a number of debates raging about various aspects of the
system. Sometimes the debates are prompted by a novel application of the
law, proposed by a creative debtor and adopted by a flexible court. Other
times the debates are about the resolution of ambiguities in the Code or the
extant case law, where courts starting from a single point have taken
different paths that reshape the rights of debtors and creditors. And still
other times an interest group persuades some portion of the relevant
bankruptcy community that the laws as written and enforced impose an
injustice on one or another party and should be changed. In all these cases,
relevant empirical evidence would likely be useful to the debate. But to
provide the needed relevant data requires yet another approach to defining
and sampling reality.
To some extent, as discussed above, we have used policy debates as a
source of questions and goals in specifying the data to be gathered from the
comprehensive sample. The question here is the extent to which we use
the debates to select another sample.
Single asset real estate cases provide an illustration. These cases have
prompted an extraordinary number of published judicial opinions, law
review articles, proposed statutory amendments, seminars, CLEs, and
newspaper articles. (An interesting empirical study might begin by
determining the ratio between published articles about single asset cases
and the total number of single asset cases.) It would be possible to draw
a sample of single asset cases and examine how they proceed through
bankruptcy."0 It might even be possible to compare them with nonfiling
single asset companies that were also in trouble. Surely the information
gained would add some much needed light to a very heated debate.
But would such a study describe enough reality to be worth the expense?
50. A very interesting study of real estate cases has been published since the Conference. See
Fenning & Tucker, supra note 1.
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This raises a much more difficult question about empirical data, a question
we empirical researchers like to skirt as much as possible: How much data
do we need to make informed policy decisions? Must there be a separate
study to inform the disparate policy debates? And will one study be
enough, or will the data be sufficiently ambiguous that they will tell us
only tantalizing fragments about each issue, prompting us to return to the
field for a more definitive answer? What kind of resources should be
devoted to shifting policy decisions from the anecdotal-and-political to the
partially-informed-and-political? We like to avoid these questions because
we recognize that they push us closer to the futility argument: we cannot
know everything, so we need not spend the resources-or slow down the
debates-to get some hard information about reality. We have a short
response to this argument: "Nonsense."
That we cannot know everything does not mean we cannot know some
very useful things. And some of those things can powerfully change
debates. Years ago, we undertook a study of consumer bankruptcy in an
environment where the assertion was seriously put forth that large numbers
of debtors were discharging debts they could easily repay and that the
system was a "source of enrichment" that debtors would use as often as the
law would allow."1 We analyzed 1557 consumer bankruptcy cases in
great detail, concluding that some fraction of the debtors undoubtedly could
have repaid their debts. We could not tell the number for sure-maybe one
percent, maybe two, maybe even five. But the data clearly demonstrated
that it was not 80% who could repay. Nor was it 50%, nor 20%.52 And
very few debtors filed more than once.53 As measured by the neediness
of the debtors who used it, the bankruptcy system was working remarkably
well. In our view, this is one of the most effective uses of data in the
policy debates: we could not know everything, but we could at least
eliminate some terribly wrong answers that might otherwise distort public
policy decisions.
So we might pick a policy debate and develop a precisely focused study
to shed some light on it. The sample would likely depend on what we
were planning to study, as in the single asset cases we described above.
This can be a very valuable approach. For example, Professor Ray
51. CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER, PURDUE UNIVERSITY, 2 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY 131-33,
139 (1982).
52. See As WE FORGIVE, supra note 15, at 220.
53. Id. at 192.
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Warner focused on the hotly disputed issue of routine fee holdbacks. 4
Judges utilize routine holdbacks to create an incentive device to encourage
attorneys to move cases to conclusion faster. This approach is supported
by the law-and-economics aficionados who embrace such incentive
manipulation. Warner tested the empirical premise by asking whether such
holdbacks had any measurable effect on the time it takes to conclude cases.
He developed data that permitted him to compare case progress in
jurisdictions that routinely employed holdbacks with progress in jurisdic-
tions that did not. He found that cases moved as quickly-or as slowly-in
both kinds of jurisdictions and that holdbacks had no discernible effect on
how long cases remained open.55 At a minimum, these data ought to
change the outlines of a longstanding debate.
E. Actors Who Can Affect the System
There is yet another reason certain cases may be deemed "important" in
the bankruptcy system. Cases may be important if certain actors,
principally judges and attorneys, can make an important difference in what
happens during a case by changing the procedures they follow. Such cases
become important to those actors because they occupy most of their time
and attention.
When we wrote about the consumer bankruptcy system, we noted that
the overwhelming number of consumer lending decisions were actuarial,
not individualized. Creditors adopted broad policies based on established
criteria, and debtors either were eligible for credit or not. There was little
about a debtor individually-her industrious nature, his family back-
ground-that affected the lending decision if it were not already encom-
passed in the routinized criteria. The same is true of meting out justice.
A large number of cases are handled routinely in the bankruptcy system.
Policies are adopted and parties must either conform or face preordained
consequences. Cases are filed, reports are due, payments must be made,
cases are dismissed, and so on, without much individual attention to most
of the cases. Much of what we will learn about the comprehensive sample
will assist in the policy decisions that establish these procedures and rules.
But there are a significant number of cases that receive far more
54. G. Ray Warner, Interim Compensation and the Routine Holdback: The Effect of the Jenkins
Case, I J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 565 (1992).
55. Id. at 578-81.
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individualized care. These are cases in which more money is at stake,
more activity is initiated by the creditors, more individually crafted
solutions are offered by counsel, more oversight is initiated by the U.S.
Trustee, and more court time and attention is allocated by the judge. These
are the cases in which extensions of exclusivity, imposition of a new value
exception to the absolute priority rule, early motions to terminate cases, and
debt classification disputes may be ferociously argued and may powerfully
affect the ultimate disposition of the case. These are also the cases in
which different forms of judicial case management may significantly affect
outcomes. These are the cases in which the crafts of lawyering and judging
matter a great deal. These might be termed the "craftable" cases. It is also
relevant that these cases are the most intellectually interesting to bench and
bar.
Judges have a powerful role to play in any case, but realistically, the role
they play in most cases is limited to a routine disposition of fairly standard
issues. They may pick an occasional consumer or small business case as
an occasion to clarify a particular point of wide applicability, as Judge
Bufford did in announcing a rule for measuring attorney conflicts of
interest in all small cases in In re Lee.56 And very small cases can
sometimes raise important issues of principle, even if they apply only
infrequently.57 But the more complex aspects of the Code, and conse-
quently, the greater opportunities for the judge to manage a business case,
occur when cases are larger. The same, of course, could be said for other
players, including the U.S. Trustee, counsel who serve creditors' commit-
tees, debtors' counsel, and so on.
Judges, attorneys, trustees, and creditors can affect outcomes in these
larger cases, and they spend a disproportionate amount of their time doing
so. In order to inform their decisionmaking, however, they need something
different from the comprehensive sample. They need to know about a
range of issues that occur in many fewer cases, but in enough cases to
warrant significant expenditure of their time. The decisions that come from
these cases are widely applied in similar cases and significantly affect how
parties negotiate out-of-court settlements. Without data about how these
56. 94 B.R. 172, 176 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989).
57. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 148 B.R. 886 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1992) (allowing recovery, as a fraudelent conveyance, of contributions to the debtor's church in the year
before bankruptcy), afr'd, 152 B.R. 939 (D. Minn. 1993). See also Laurie Goodstein, Religious Groups
Fight U.S. in Bank-ruptcy Case, WASH. PosT, May 23, 1994, at Al.
1994] 1285
Washington University Open Scholarship
1286 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
cases generally operate, and some systematic view of the impact of
different approaches, judges are left to make decisions without crucial
factual context.
These cases-more common than the very rare publicly traded cases, but
less common than the routine cases that fill the docket-are the significant
source of many published judicial opinions. They are also the object of a
variety of different case management approaches. Any judge or attorney
generally knows which cases these are, but developing a protocol to
determine which cases are in the universe and eligible for the sample is a
bit tricky. In particular, it must be remembered that a sample criterion
must generate enough cases to create statistical cells large enough for
statistical analysis, but it cannot waste resources by causing collection of
many irrelevant cases in each category.
We could use certain levels of debt and assets as proxies for these cases
but there are no baseline data to help us determine in advance whether a
particular level will generate a sufficient number of the cases we want. It
is unclear, for example, whether exclusivity issues arise in 1% or 10% or
50% of the cases with assets and debts in the $1-$ 10 million range, but we
need some idea of the incidence in order to draw a sample. To complicate
the problem, it is not clear whether either the incidence or the disposition
of cases may differ in the $10-$100 million range, making two or three or
four different samples necessary to understand what is happening. The
further complications of "local legal culture" may mean that the answers
to these questions would vary from district to district.5 8
Notwithstanding these difficulties, one could argue that these cases are
especially worth studying because the results will really matter. Congress
may or may not pay attention to comprehensive data, and the explanatory
power of such data is always limited by the very scope of its cover-
age-broad but thin. In the craftable cases, however, specific findings may
well assist judges and lawyers to do a better job. If one is limited to
drawing a single bucket of water, it may be better to pour it into the garden
rather than the field.
VII. ACADEMIC DEBATES
The obvious source for empirical questions and hypotheses is academia,
including conferences such as this one. But that point brings us full circle
58. See Local Legal Culture, supra note 28.
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to the critique that began this paper. Most academic theorizing in our field
at the present time does not generate testable hypotheses. The theories
proposed are almost defiantly far removed from reality and therefore
untestable by empirical research.
We were pressed by our colleagues at this Conference to formulate
formal hypotheses for our study following one version of the classic
scientific model. But that model supposes that theorists will propose
testable hypotheses and empiricists will then go forth and test-the two
groups working in tandem. It does not suppose that the empiricists have
to propose as well as test. Stephen Weinberg proposes a theory that
predicts the 'Z' particle and then Carlo Rubbia looks for it in nature. 9
When Rubbia finds it, they both get Nobel prizes. This sounds good to us,
but where are the predictions to be tested? Despite the stem (but good-
natured) challenge we issued in this paper, no one at the Conference
proposed a single hypothesis to be tested. For the most part, the current
academic debates are useless as a source of empirical questions.
Even more surprising to us was the absence of suggestions for a "second
sample." We expected our colleagues to have a thousand ideas for the
most important subset of reality to study among the business
cases-especially if they did not have to actually collect the data. Instead,
there was an almost universal rejection of any sample other than a
comprehensive one. On reflection, we realize that this view may actually
be consistent with the implicit assumption in recent literature that there are
no important distinctions among types or sizes of cases.60
The only proposal that attracted wide support at the Conference was that
we survey nonbankrupt companies by way of comparison with the bankrupt
sample. We intend to make comparisons between our sample and
nonbankrupt companies generally, of course, drawing on various business
data bases. The suggestion at the Conference, however, was to sample
some subset of companies in financial trouble, but not in bankruptcy.
Unfortunately, no one was able to articulate how such a sample would be
defined, much less located. As with our bankruptcy sample, it was to be
universal (that is, not limited by size, type of company, and so on), but no
one had much more to say.
If the point is to sample nonbankrupt companies who are in financial
59. ROBERT K. ADAIR, THE GREAT DESIGN: PARTICLES, FIELDS, AND CREATION 332-38 (1987);
see also LEON LEDERMAN & DICK TERESI, THE GOD PARTICLE 330-33 (1993).
60. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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trouble, how shall we define financial trouble? If we say every company
that has missed a bank payment, we will be far too inclusive and the
comparison will not differ much from a comparison of the bankruptcy
sample with companies generally. We should not spend our resources
replicating those data. To make a useful, new comparison, we must be
looking for companies at the margins of bankruptcy. Yet to define that
sample, we must complete our current bankruptcy study to learn something
about the companies that are in bankruptcy. We cannot meaningfully
discuss what it means to be at the margin if we do not know what it means
to be over it. One interlocutor insisted that we should draw a sample "just
like" the bankruptcy sample, only not in bankruptcy. We asked how that
might be done if we did not know who was in bankruptcy.6' We still do
not have the answer.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding our sometimes cranky demeanor about the state of the
bankruptcy policy debates, we have raised these issues to encourage other
scholars, not to scare them off. We want other scholars, including those
not of an empirical bent, to consider what is involved in designing one
aspect of an empirical study. We hope to draw on the intelligence and
insights of others to better shape our own work and to help us make
decisions about how to pursue this research.
We invite everyone in the field, as we invited everyone at this Confer-
ence, to give us one question they would most like to ask of any of the
realities described here. But the price of admission is that the inquirer must
define how the question can be asked-that is, how the answer can be
extracted and from which sample the answer should be collected. In
developing a question, it will be useful for the inquirer to remember that
empirical work functions best in revealing propositions to be false (or
unlikely to be true) as opposed to demonstrating that propositions are true.
61. If we succeed in doing what our fellow Conferees did not do-defining the proposed
nonbankrupt sample-how could we find the companies? It was suggested that we "talk to banks."
Can one really imagine getting a large number of banks to reveal the names of companies in default
for certain periods or with debt-to-earnings or debt-to-equity ratios of a certain level? If not, do banks
themselves have the sort of data about these companies that would be useful on an anonymous basis
and would they (or could they) release those data? Furthermore, Professor Baird's paper cites data
suggesting that many small businesses do not have bank debt at all. Douglas G. Baird, The
Reorganization of Closely Held Firms and the "Opt Out" Problem, 72 VASH. U. L.Q. 913, 919 (1994).
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We also confess to writing this paper with a missionary spirit. We hope
that discussion of the thought process that forces the researcher to frame
empirical questions would make more obvious the importance of empirical
questions to both academic and policy debates. Even if we cannot entice
everyone else to conduct the studies, we would be enormously pleased to
see the dialogue modified to highlight underlying empirical assumptions
and to make theoretical work a bit less than respectable if it lacks testable
hypotheses. Even better would be a general agreement that sweeping new
policy pronouncements are premature until something more is known about
the underlying realities.
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